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RECOGNIZING THE FATHER-ILLEGITIMATE CHILD
RELATIONSHIP FOR INTESTATE SUCCESSION-
TRIMBLE V. GORDON
Discrimination against illegitimate children, as a class, has been a
common and well-accepted element of the law in many areas.1 Al-
though the unreasonableness of this form of discrimination has re-
ceived increasing recognition from both legislatures and courts,2 some
discriminatory statutes persist 3 and, in two instances within the last
ten years, have received the express sanction of the United States
Supreme Court. 4 Recently, however, the Supreme Court applied an
equal protection analysis to eliminate a measure of the remaining dis-
crimination found in intestate succession statutes.5
1. A cursory analysis of substantive law illustrates that legitimate children enjoy preferred
status over illegitimate children in several areas of the law such as: citizenship, 8 U.S.C. §
1409(a), (b) (1970); pension benefits, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 108 , § 8-120 (1975); inheritance and
gift tax, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:34-2 (West Supp. 1977-1978); Bank of Montclair v. McCutcheon,
107 N.J. Eq. 564, 152 A. 379 (1931) (illegitimates excluded from low estate tax rate for "chil-
dren"); adoption, N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 111(a) (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1976-1977); child's
right to support, VA. CODE ANN. § 20-61.1 (1975). See H. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND
SOCIAL POLICY 21-42 (1971) [hereinafter cited as KRAUSE]. See generally Note, The Rights of
Illegitimates Under Federal Statutes, 76 HARV. L. REV. 337 (1962). See notes 2 & 24 infra for
cases which struck down the legitimate-illegitimate distinction in other areas of law.
2. See, e.g., Bales v. Elder, 118 Ill. 436, 11 N.E. 421 (1887), which stated:
The common law, excluding a bastard from inheritance from any person, remained
the law of this state until section 53, chapter 109, entitled "Wills," of the Revised
Statutes of 1845, was enacted, which provided that a bastard might inherit the
estate of a mother, when she died unmarried, leaving an estate.
Id. at 438-39, 11 N.E. at 421. See also Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974) (social
security benefits); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (paternal support); Weber v. Aetna Cas.
& Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (workmen's compensation); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972) (custody); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (wrongful death); DeSylva v. Ballentine,
351 U.S. 570 (1956), rehearing denied, 352 U.S. 859 (1956) (copyright); Hutchinson Inv. Co. v.
Caldwell, 152 U.S. 65 (1894) (public land).
3. See KRAUSE, supra note 1, at 25-26: "Residual statutory discrimination between legiti-
mate and illegitimate offspring with respect to inheritance from the mother is very uncommon.
In most states, however, the illegitimate child still cannot inherit from his father, other than by
will." Id. at 25 (footnotes omitted).
4. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976), involved alleged discrimination in the Social
Security Act against a sub-class of illegitimates who were required to show dependency before
receiving surviving children's benefits. Legitimate children and certain illegitimates were not
required to submit individualized proof of dependency. The Court upheld the statute because
"the challenged classifications were justified as reasonable empirical judgments which were con-
sistent with a design to qualify entitlement to benefits upon a child's dependency at the time of
the parent's death." Id. at 510. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971), upheld a Louisiana
intestate succession statute that denied equal inheritance rights to illegitimates by holding that
the statute furthered the state's interests in the protection and strengthening of family life and
in the accurate disposition of property.
5. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
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In Trimble v. Gordon, the Supreme Court was presented with an
Illinois intestate succession statute excluding illegitimates from shar-
ing in the estates of their fathers unless the natural parents intermar-
ried and the father acknowledged the illegitimate child.' The appel-
lant, Deta Mona Trimble, was an illegitimate child whose paternity
had been adjudicated in a prior child support proceeding. 7 Because
the father, Sherman Gordon, had neither married the mother nor
formally acknowledged his daughter, she received no portion of Gor-
don's estate upon his death intestate. 8 Instead, the estate was di-
vided among Gordon's parents and collateral relatives. 9  The validity
of the statute, section 12 of the Illinois Probate Act, and the disposi-
tion of Deta Mona Trimble's father's estate were upheld by the Il-
linois Supreme Court. 10  The Illinois court relied on the United
States Supreme Court's opinion in Labine v. Vincent which upheld a
Louisiana intestate succession statute that discriminated against il-
legitimates. 11
The United States Supreme Court, however, invalidated the Il-
linois statute, stating that the type of discriminatory treatment of il-
legitimate children embodied in the statute served no valid state
interest and "cannot be squared with the command of the equal pro-
tection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 12 This Note will dis-
cuss the appellant's argument that discrimination within a class is
unconstitutional, identify the equal protection review applied in
6. The relevant portion of the statute provides:
An illegitimate child is heir of its mother and of any maternal ancestor, and of any
person from whom its mother might have inherited, if living; and the lawful issue of
an illegitimate person shall represent such person and take, by descent, any estate
which the parent would have taken, if living. An illegitimate child whose parents
inter-marry and who is acknowledged by the father as the father's child shall be
considered legitimate.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 12 (1970). The statute was recodified without material change as ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 2-2 (Supp. 1976-1977). Since the lower court opinions, briefs, and Supreme
Court opinion all referred to the statute as § 12, this Note will continue to do so.
7. 430 U.S. at 764.
8. Id.
9. id.
10. See In re Estate of Karas, 61 1ll.2d 40, 52, 329 N.E.2d 234, 240 (1975). Karas upheld
the exclusion of illegitimate children of intestate men by applying minimal scrutiny. The court
held the classification rationally related to the state's interests in the promotion of legitimate
family relationships and the accurate distribution of property. After Karas was decided, the
Illinois Supreme Court heard oral arguments for Trimble. Since the Court apparently con-
sidered the issues adequately discussed in Karas, it issued no written opinion in Trimble. See
430 U.S. at 765.
11. See note 4 supra.
12. 430 U.S. at 776.
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Trimble, and identify other legislative provisions which may still de-
prive some illegitimates of an interest in their father's estate.
INTRA-CLASS DISCRIMINATION
In Trimble, the appellant argued that the Illinois statute violated
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in that
some illegitimates were treated differently than others. 13 In the
past, the Supreme Court has held that "intra-class" discrimination, or
the treatment of some members of a class differently from other
members of the same class, is unconstitutional. 14 In section 12, the
sub-class of illegitimates whose fathers died intestate suffered the loss
of succession rights. The discrimination was based on the sex of the
decedent parent.15
Two United States Supreme Court cases support the argument that
some disparity between illegitimates, predicated on the gender of the
decedent parent, is unconstitutional. Jimenez v. Weinberger 16 held
that discrimination against a sub-class of illegitimates was a violation
of equal protection guaranteed by the due process clause of the Fifth
13. The appellant posed this question in her brief:
Does Section 12 of the Illinois Probate Act, providing that an illegitimate child
whose father dies intestate is not his heir, but that an illegitimate child whose
mother dies intestate is her heir, violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment by discriminating invidiously among illegitimate children based
on the sex of the decedent?
Brief for Appellant at 3, Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
14. This form of discrimination is the analytical equivalent of the due process irrebuttable
presumption doctrine. See Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 638-41 (1974) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); Comment, Jimenez v. Weinberger: Applying a New Equal Protection Test, 10 NEW
ENC. L. REV. 561 (1974). An irrebuttable presumption is a conclusive presumption of one fact,
given proof of another fact. See generally Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632
(1974) (holding irrebuttable presumption of disability applied to pregnant teachers unconstitu-
tional); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973) (holding irrebuttable presumption of non-residency
applied to students unconstitutional). Expressed as an irrebuttable presumption, section 12
takes the failure of an illegitimate's alleged father to marry the child's mother and acknowledge
the child as conclusive proof that the man is not the child's father. Therefore, the child has no
claim against the man's estate. The irrebuttable presumption doctrine in equal protection re-
view has been widely criticized. See, e.g., Note, Irrebuttable Presumptions: An Illusory
Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 449 (1975); Note, The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in the
Supreme Court, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1534 (1974); Note, The Conclusive Presumption Doctrine:
Equal Process or Due Protection?, 72 MICH. L. REV. 800 (1974).
15. See Green v. Woodard, 40 Ohio App.2d 101, 318 N.E.2d 397 (1974) (intestate succes-
sion statute which was construed to exclude illegitimates of intestate men held unconstitutional):
"There is also discrimination within the class between various types of illegitimates, such as
those illegitimates inheriting from and through the mother, and those inheriting from and
through the father. It is this latter intra-class discrimination that is under attack in this case."
Id. at 113, 318 N.E.2d at 406.
16. 417 U.S. 628 (1974).
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Amendment. 17  Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld 18 suggested in dicta that
discrimination against children based on the gender of the child's de-
cedent parent was impermissible. 19
The Supreme Court did not address this issue in its opinion in
Trimble. However, the holding in Trimble fell short of requiring that
all illegitimates be treated alike.20 Thus, intra-class discrimination
apparently was not held unconstitutional in this case. In addition, in-
tra-class discrimination analysis has been criticized and the Court may
be abandoning the approach. 2 ' Their action in Trimble was
foreshadowed by a 1976 illegitimacy case which upheld a challenged
statute that discriminated among illegitimates. 22 In Trimble, the
Supreme Court found other grounds for invalidating the challenged
statute.
23
THE EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS IN Trimble
Although this result was consistent with previous case law,2 4 Trim-
ble did not apply the analysis of the earliest illegitimacy decisions.
Those decisions had intimated that the Court was treating illegitimacy
17. Chief Justice Burger, speaking for the majority, illustrates this principle, stating:
Thus, for all this is shown in this record, the two subclasses of illegitimates stand on
equal footing, and the potential for spurious claims is the same as to both; hence to
conclusively deny one subclass benefits presumptively available to the other denies
the former the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the due process provision
of the Fifth Amendment.
Id. at 637.
18. 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
19. In an opinion written by Justice Brennan, the Supreme Court struck down section 402
of the Social Security Act which provided for different treatment of the survivors of men and
women wage-earners, stating: "Given the purpose of enabling the surviving parent to remain at
home to care for a child, the gender-based distinction of § 402(g) is entirely irrational. The
classification discriminates among surviving children solely on the basis of the sex of the surviv-
ing parent." Id. at 651.
20. Trimble was critical of the difference embodied in section 12 between the rights of
illegitimate children of intestate women and the rights of illegitimate children of intestate men.
430 U.S. at 768 n.13.
21. See note 14 supra.
22. See Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976), and note 4 supra.
23. See text accompanying notes 24-60 infra.
24. Classifications of illegitimate children were struck down in ten of twelve cases. See
Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976) (upholding requirement of individual proof of depen-
dency for unacknowledged illegitimates claiming surviving children's benefits); Jimenez v.
Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974) (invalidating statute which discriminated between two classes
of illegitimates in granting disability benefits); New Jersey Welfare Rights Organization v.
Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973) (invalidating state aid program which limited benefits to married
couples with minor children); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (illegitimates granted same
support right given legitimate children); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972)
(prohibiting state from denying workmen's compensation benefits to dependent unacknowledged
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as a suspect classification, 25 requiring the application of strict
scrutiny, the higher of two equal protection standards of review. 26 To
justify the use of a suspect classification in a statute, the state would
have the burden of showing that the classification bore not merely a
rational relation to a legitimate state interest, but further, that the
classification was necessary to promote a compelling state interest. 27
Subsequent decisions, however, explicitly denied that illegitimacy
had suspect classification status. 28 Therefore, under two-tier analysis,
since neither a suspect classification nor a fundamental interest 29 was
involved the classification was subject to minimal scrutiny, afforded a
presumption of constitutionality, and evaluated by the rational basis
test.30 Under the rational basis test, the classification would be held
illegitimates); Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971) (upholding the state's'right to exclude
illegitimate children from an interest in father's intestate property); Glona v. Am. Guar. & Liab.
Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968) (invalidating statute denying mother's cause of action for illegiti-
mate child's wrongful death); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (invalidating statute denying
illegitimate's cause of action for wrongful death of mother); Beaty v. Weinberger, 478 F.2d 300
(5th Cir. 1973) (prohibiting exclusion of after-born illegitimates from parent's social security
disability benefits); Griffin v. Richardson, 346 F. Supp. 1226 (D. Md.) (prohibiting dispropor-
tionate reduction in social security benefits applied to illegitimates), aff'd, 409 U.S. 1069 (1972);
Davis v. Richardson, 342 F. Supp. 588 (D. Conn.) (prohibiting discrimination against illegiti-
mates in payment of benefits on death of wage-earning parent), aff'd, 409 U.S. 1096 (1972).
25. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973), which defined
a suspect classification as one: "saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of
purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to
command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process." See, e.g., Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (race);
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (nationality); See Note, Developments in the
Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1120 (1969).
26. See KRAUSE, supra note 1, at 70; Gray & Rudovsky, The Court Acknowledges the Il-
legitimate: Levy v. Louisiana and Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Ins. Co., 118 U.
PA. L. REV. 1, 4-7 (1969).
27. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (no compelling state interest to
justify predicating welfare benefits on citizenship or long-term residency); Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967) (no compelling state interest to justify ban on interracial marriage); Korematsu
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (national security may constitute a compelling state inter-
est).
28. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 767 (1977); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495
(1976). "We therefore adhere to our earlier view, see Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971),
that the Act's discrimination between individuals on the basis of their legitimacy does not
Icommand extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process' which our most
exacting scrutiny would entail." Id. at 506.
29. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (voting); Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (criminal procedural rights); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535
(1942) (procreation); see generally Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV.
L. REV. 1065 (1969).
30. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc. 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (act reg-
ulating opticians upheld); F.S. Royster Guano v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920) (state revenue
law upheld); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911) (act protecting natural
mineral springs upheld).
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valid if any set of facts could be conceived to show the classification
embodied in the statute rationally related to a legitimate state inter-
est. 31  )uring the years that the two-tiered equal protection analysis
was consistently applied, the level of scrutiny seemed to determine
the outcome. That is, the application of strict scrutiny nearly always
resulted in the invalidation of the statute on equal protection
grounds, while the application of the minimal level of scrutiny invari-
ably resulted in a holding of validity. 32
The application of these tests would either allow courts to apply
strict scrutiny and consequently protect the rights of illegitimates, or
to apply minimal scrutiny and grant legislatures wide latitude in
dealing with birth out of wedlock. As a result of its dissatisfaction
with these limited alternatives, the United States Supreme Court has
in effect adopted an intermediate level of scrutiny to apply to some
classifications although it continues to articulate the two-tier approach
to equal protection analysis. 3 3  Several theories of equal protection
analysis include an intermediate level of scrutiny. 34
31. See, e.g., Jimenez v. Richardson, 353 F. Supp. 1356 (N.D. 111. 1973), vacated and
remanded sub nor. Jiminez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974). The court articulated the test
as follows:
The traditional test consists of a two-part inquiry that first identifies the purpose or
objectives of a legislative scheme and then asks whether the challenged discrimina-
tion bears a rational relationship to one of those purposes. Moreover, the purpose
need not have been a main objective of the statute or even one that the legislators
had in mind when they passed it.
Id. at 1360. See also McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S- 420 (1961); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic
Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
32. See Note, The Less Restrictive Alternative in Constitutional Adjudication: An Analysis, a
Justification, and Some Criteria, 27 VAND. L. REv. 971, 995 (1974). Until the Court's approach
changed, only one case found a classification invalid by applying minimal scrutiny. See Morey v.
Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957) (act which exempted American Express Co. money orders from
regulation and licensing held violative of equal protection).
33. See Turkington, Equal Protection of the Laws in Illinois, 25 DEPAUL L. REV. 385, 405
(1976); Note, Illegitimacy and Equal Protection, 49 N.Y.U.L. REV. 479 (1974); Note, A Question
of Balance: Statutory Classifications Under the Equal Protection Clause, 26 STAN. L. REv. 155
(1973). The Court has also applied intermediate scrutiny to sex classifications. See Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). See generally Johnston, Sex Discrimination and the Supreme
Court -1971 -1974, 49 N.Y.U.L. REV. 617 (1974). But see Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677 (1973) (plurality applied strict scrutiny in striking clown statute requiring female members of
the armed services to prove dependency of spouse).
34. One theory is Justice Marshall's sliding scale theory, articulated in his dissenting opin-
ions in San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 11 70-133 (1973), and Dan-
dridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 508-30 (1970). Marshall's analysis calls for balancing the rights
threatened by the classification against the importance of the state interests. A right will be
given more weight as it approaches a fundamental right, while a state interest will be given
more weight as it approaches a compelling state interest. See note 27 supra. An over-inclusive
classification affecting more individuals than necessary to further the objective of the law, or an
under-inclusive classification failing to reach some individuals who should be reached in order to
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The theory that most accurately describes the Supreme Court's ap-
proach in Trimble is Professor Gerald Gunther's means-oriented
analysis. 35  Gunther's approach focuses on the relation between the
classification and the state interest. The classification, which is the
"means" for advancing the state interest, must bear an actual, rational
relationship to articulated state interests in order to satisfy means-
oriented intermediate scrutiny. 36 This test is similar in operation to
minimal scrutiny but more difficult to satisfy because any interest n-
articulated by the state will not be considered in the analysis. 37
Moreover, the court is required to discount any articulated interest if
it appears that the articulated interest was only designed to obscure
some other unconstitutional purpose which the classification really
furthers. 38  In addition, similar to the test of strict scrutiny, the con-
stitutionalitv of the statute will not be presumed. 39  The means-
oriented approach results in more deference to the state than either
strict scrutiny or other forms of intermediate scrutiny. It leaves the
state free to employ any classification which furthers a legitimate state
interest regardless of the availability of less restrictive alternative clas-
sifications that effectively further the same state interest. 40
APPLICATION OF MEANS-ORIENTED ANALYSIS IN Trimble
Even though the means-oriented middle tier test is less restrictive
than strict scrutiny or other intermediate tests, application of this
analysis resulted in the invalidation of the statute challenged by
Trimble. Before testing the rationality of the classification as a means
of advancing the actual state interests, the Court examined the four
state interests that -allegedly were promoted by the statute. 41
further the objective of the law, would not he tolerated. See Tussinan & tenBrock, The Equal
Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REX'. 341 (1949). Nor would a state interest le considered
if held to he a mere rationalization designed to conceal a genuine, invalid purpose. ld.
35. See Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term -Forevard: In Search of Evolving Doc-
trine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 1 IARv. L. REv. 1 (1972).
According to Gunther: "The intensified means scrutiny would, in short, close the wide gap
between the strict scrutiny of the new equal protection and the minimal scrutiny of the old not
by abandoning the strict hut by raising the level of the minimal from virtual abdication to
genuine judicial inquiry." Id. at 24. The nature of intermediate scrutiny applied in other il-
legitimacy cases is discussed in: Note, Illegitimacy and Equal Protection: Two Tiers or An
Analytical Grab-Bag?, 7 Loy. Cim. L.J. 754 (1976); Note, Illegitimacy and Equal Protection, 49
N.Y.U.L. REV. 497 (1974).
36. See Gunther, supra note 35, at 20-21.
37. Id. at 21.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See 430 U.S. at 767-68, 774-76.
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The Supreme Court determined that the state's dual purpose in
enacting section 12 was to provide an intestate succession system
which was more equitable to illegitimates than the previous system
and to protect intestate decedents' property from fraudulent
claims. 42 The Supreme Court rejected the appellee's argument that
the exclusion of illegitimates in section 12 was an attempt to express
the presumed intent of parents who die intestate. 43  Fathers of il-
legitimates are presumed to know that their illegitimate offspring
would not inherit from them absent a will. The fathers presumably
agree to this statutory exclusion by failing to execute a will, according
to the appellee. 44 The Court ignored the merits of this argument
and held that the Illinois legislature did not consider "presumed in-
tent" as a purpose when it passed section 12.45 The Supreme Court
based this decision on the absence of the "presumed intent" rationale
from the Illinois Supreme Court's articulation of purposes. 46 And
since the Court held that furthering the presumed intent of illegiti-
mates' fathers was not the purpose of the statute, even a substantial
rational relation between exclusion of illegitimate children of intestate
men and the intent of such men would not require the Court to up-
hold the statute using the means-oriented test. 47
The Court also questioned the contention that the purpose of sec-
tion 12 was to promote legitimate family relationships, even though
the Illinois Supreme Court had held otherwise. 48 The United States
Supreme Court stated that "[p]enalizing children as a means of in-
fluencing their parents seems inconsistent with the desire of the Il-
linois Legislature to make intestate succession law more just to il-
42. Id. at 776.
43. Id. at 774-76.
44. Id. at 774.
45. Id. at 774-75.
46. The Supreme Court reasoned that:
The theory of presumed intent is not relied upon in the careful opinion of the
Illinois Supreme Court examining both the history and the text of § 12. This omis-
sion is not without significance, as one would expect a state supreme court to iden-
tify the state interests served by a statute of its state legislature.
Id. at 775. Had "presumed intent" been found a purpose of section 12, the Supreme Court still
may have ruled it an unacceptable justification for discrimination. See Mathews v. Lucas, 427
U.S. 495 (1976); Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Eskra v. Morton, 524 F.2d 9 (7th Cir.
1975). In addition, the presumption itself may be invalid. The 1968 Omnibus Survey conducted
in Illinois by the University of Illinois found that 64% of the respondents agreed that illegiti-
mates should inherit from intestate fathers as if they were of legitimate birth. See KRAUSE,
supra note 1, at 167.
47. See note 37 supra.
48. See In re Estate of Karas, 61 lll.2d 40, 48, 329 N.E.2d 234, 238 (1975) (upholding
section 12).
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legitimate children."- 49  This articulated legitimate state interest
failed as a justification for excluding illegitimates because of a lack of a
rational relationship between the two. 50 Also, the Supreme Court
felt that making the intestate succession system more just to illegiti-
mates and promoting legitimate family relationships were such incon-
gruous goals that the Illinois legislature would not have attempted to
achieve both goals in the same statute.
The Supreme Court did accept the state's interest in the accurate
disposition of property by preventing fraudulent claims against intes-
tate decedents' estates as one of the actual purposes for section 12.51
However, the Court held that this state interest was insufficient to
justify the exclusion of illegitimates of intestate men. 52  While focus-
ing on the relation between the classification and the state purpose,
the Supreme Court appeared to hold that section 12 was unconstitu-
tional because some illegitimates deprived of inheritance rights posed
no threat to the state's interest in accurate property distribution. 53 In
other words, the classification was over-inclusive. 54  It encompassed
more illegitimates than were needed to achieve the purpose of the
statute. Over-inclusiveness is a factor in strict scrutiny, 55 but not sig-
nificant in Gunther's means-oriented intermediate scrutiny. 56
The presence of this apparently incongruous factor in the Supreme
Court's analysis was due to the Court's determination of more than a
single purpose for section 12.57 The dual purpose of section 12 re-
quired the Court to test the rationality of the classification in relation
to both of the partially conflicting purposes: (1) advancing the rights
of illegitimates; and (2) protecting decedents' property from fraudu-
lent claims. Had the Court determined that the only purpose of sec-
tion 12 was to improve the succession rights of illegitimates, then the
49. 430 U.S. at 768 n.13.
50. "No one disputes the appropriateness of Illinois' concern with the family unit, perhaps
the most fundamental social institution of our society. The flaw in the analysis lies elsewhere
.. . .[T]he court below did not address the relation between § 12 and the promotion of legiti-
mate family relationships, thus leaving the constitutional analysis incomplete." Id. at 769.
51. See note 42 and accompanying text supra.
52. 430 U.S. at 770-73.
53. Id. at 771.
54. See note 34 supra for a definition of over-inclusiveness.
55. See Gunther, supra note 35, at 24.
56. See text accompanying note 40 supra.
57. The position of the Court was:
[W]e find in § 12 a primary purpose to provide a system of intestate succession
more just to illegitimate children than the prior law, a purpose tempered by a
secondary interest in protecting against spurious claims of paternity.
430 U.S. at 776.
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rationality of the classification would have been tested only against
that purpose. Consequently, no rational reason would exist for
excluding any illegitimate. But the Court, in an effort to define the
legislative purpose as accurately as possible, acknowledged that pre-
vention of fraudulent claims against decedents' estates was a secon-
dary purpose of section 12.58 The finding of over-inclusiveness
served merely to demonstrate how far a classification could go as a
means of implementing a secondary state purpose before the classifi-
cation unconstitutionally interfered with the conflicting primary pur-
pose. The Supreme Court in Trimble found that the only illegitimates
still permissibly excluded are those who threaten the state's secon-
dary purpose in preventing fraudulent claims. 59  The Court did not
specify which illegitimates threaten the state's interest, leaving that
determination to the state legislatures. 60 Illegitimates such as Deta
Mona Trimble, whose paternity was adjudicated before her father's
death, clearly present no such threat of a fraudulent claim.
DRAWBACKS OF MEANS-ORIENTED ANALYSIS
The application in Trimble of the means-oriented approach to
equal protection analysis illustrates two related problems with the
approach. The first problem is identifying the purpose of the statute
and determining which one of several purposes was of primary impor-
tance and which were secondary considerations. 61 Ranking the pur-
poses of a statute requires judicial value judgments which Gunther's
approach was designed to avoid. 62 While a clear legislative history
may alleviate the need for such judgments, a court is still required to
58. Id.
59. Id. at 772.
60. Id. at 771.
61. See generally Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977). "Rarely can it be said that a legislature or administrative body operating under a broad
mandate made a decision motivated solely by a single concern, or even that a particular purpose
was a 'dominant' or 'primary' one." Id. at 265.
Justice Rehnquist recognized this problem in his dissent in Trimble:
The appropriate "scrutiny" in the eyes of the Court, appears to involve some
analysis of the relation of the "purpose" of the legislature to the "means" by which
it chooses to carry out that purpose. . . .The question of what "motivated" the
various individual legislators to vote for this particular section of the Probate Code,
and the Governor of Illinois to sign it, is an extremely complex and difficult one to
answer. ...
430 U.S. at 781-83 (Rehoquist, J., dissenting).
62. According to Gunther: "An invigorated old equal protection scrutiny would not involve
adjudication on the basis of fundamental interests with shaky constitutional roots. Nor would it
require a critical evaluation of the relative weights of asserted state purposes." Gunther, supra
note 35, at 21.
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apply some review to such articulated purposes to insure that legiti-
mate state interests are not being merely articulated in order to enact
a statute for an otherwise invalid purpose. A second problem is test-
ing the rationality of the classification in relation to a multi-purpose
statute. 63 The classification may substantially advance some of the
objectives, to the detriment of other objectives. In this situation, a
court takes on a difficult task analogous to a legislature's attempts to
draft bills which satisfy conflicting interest groups. A court is further
hampered by a limitation of resources and input.
Even though the Court overcame these two problems in applying
means-oriented middle tier scrutiny, in Trimble, the approach was
too weak to permit the Court to compel adoption of the least restric-
tive alternative classification: the exclusion of' only those illegitimates
who have not established paternity. It is indisputable that the exclu-
sion of other illegitimates, such as those who have not established
paternity by the death of their putative father, would thwart some
fraudulent claims and thereby further accurate property distribu-
tion. 64 The determination of whether this state interest was constitu-
tionally significant enough to warrant the exclusion of' such illegiti-
mates was beyond the scope of the means-oriented analysis. Other
approaches to equal protection would have allowed the Court to make
that determination. 65  The use of means-oriented analysis limited the
Court's prohibition to exclusions of illegitimates who clearly did not
threaten the accurate distribution of property, leaving the state free
to choose any other exclusion. 66
63. Gunther recognized this problem, but offered no solution:
The call for testing the rationality of means on the basis of state-articulated purposes
raises other complications as well. A legislature may legitimately have a multiplicity
of purposes, especially in carving exceptions from the scope of a general statute.
Court inquiry should not be limited to a primary purpose; subsidiary purposes may
also support the rationality of the means.
Gunther, supra note 35, at 47.
64. The problem of false paternity claims is not an illusory one:
Paternity practice has suffered from the old saw to the effect that "maternity is a
matter of fact whereas paternity is a matter of opinion." Indeed, this facile phrase is
responsible for much of the remaining discrimination against the illegitimate child.
It furnishes what seems to be a rational argument against the illegitimate's claim to
his father. Unfortunately, applied to current paternity practice, the maxim retains
validity.
KRAUSE, supra note 1, at 106.
65. Sliding scale analysis would have accomplished this by holding the importance of the
illegitimate's rights outweighed the importance of the state interest in property distribution.
Strict scrutiny would have accomplished the same thing by holding property distribution not a
compelling state interest. See notes 25, 27, 34 and accompanying text supra.
66. Gunther's model has been criticized on this point. See Tribe, Foreward: Toward a
Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1973); Note, Legisla-
tive Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123 (1972).
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THE SCOPE OF PERTINENT EXCLUSIONS
One category of illegitimates which the state may exclude from an
intestate succession scheme would be illegitimates whose paternity
had not been adjudicated prior to the putative father's death. 67 The
constitutionality of this statutory scheme has been tested and upheld
in the state of Indiana. 68 Requiring paternity adjudication before the
putative father's death would minimize the illegitimate's chance to
secure inheritance rights where the father dies before or immediately
after the birth of his child. Furthermore, in a situation where the
parents of a child plan to marry after the child has been conceived,
the death of the father before the marriage ceremony will result in
the child's illegitimate birth and preclude the child from inheriting
from his father, contrary to the father's intent. 69
In addition to exclusions within the intestate succession statute, the
states have some degree of freedom in creating requirements of proof
of paternity. 70  Proving paternity, of course, remains the primary
step for an illegitimate to secure any right against his father. 71 Con-
sequently, even if an intestate succession statute excludes no illegiti-
mates, the child's claim may be barred by operation of the state's
paternity statute or case law. One reason why paternity statutes are
often unfair to illegitimate children is that the statutes are designed to
serve such interests as protecting accused fathers from false claims,
67. See, e.g., Indiana's intestate succession statute which provides in relevant part:
For the purpose of inheritance to, through, and from an illegitimate child, such
child shall be treated the same as if he were the legitimate child of his father if but
only if, (1) the paternity of such child has been established by law, during the
father's lifetime; or (2) the putative father marries the mother of the child and
acknowledges the child to be his own.
IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-2-7(b) (Burns 1972).
68. See Burnett v. Camden, 253 Ind. 354, 254 N.E.2d 199 (1970) (requirement of paternity
adjudication prior to father's death held rationally related to prevention of fraudulent claims),
appeal dismissed & cert. denied, 399 U.S. 901 (1970). See also In re Estate of Pakarinen, 287
Minn. 330, 332, 178 N.W.2d 714, 715 (1970) (upholding statute requiring written declaration by
father in addition to paternity adjudication), appeal dismissed, 402 U.S. 903 (1971). A similar
requirement passed the Illinois House in 1975. See Amendment No.1 to H.B. 733, 79th I11.
Gen. Assembly (bill originally introduced March 12, 1975 and amended May 12, 1975).
69. See generally Krantz v. Harris, 40 Wis.2d 709, 162 N.W.2d 628 (1968), in which a child
whose parents were engaged, but whose father died before either the child's birth or the mar-
riage ceremony, was barred from recovering under the state's wrongful death act because pater-
nity had not been established by written acknowledgement by the father, adjudication of pater-
nity, or admission of paternity by the father in open court.
70. See 430 U.S. at 772 n.14.
71. KRAUSE, supra note 1. "The problem of ascertaining paternity will always remain the
irreducible minimum relevance of birth out of wedlock, and it may be stipulated that 'equal
protection' must be limited to those illegitimates whose paternity has been established.... Id.
at 82.
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and aiding the mothers of illegitimates. 72  As was seen in the Illinois
intestate succession statute, the illegitimate child's interests are some-
times shortchanged. In fact, the Illinois paternity statute limits the
action to the mother in most cases. 73 An illegitimate has no standing
to establish his own paternity but must depend on his mother to in-
stitute a successful paternity action to secure rights.
Before Trimble, the illegitimate depended on the father's will or
acknowledgement and marriage to secure inheritance rights. 74 The
effect of Trimble, then, merely shifts this dependency from the father
to the mother. 75 The assumption is that the mother is more likely to
look after the interests of her child. This assumption may only be
valid as long as the interests of the child coincide with the mother's
own interests. A mother's decision to establish paternity of her child
may be determined by factors such as avoiding publicity or emotional
upset, or the possibility of monetary gain from a settlement. 76 These
factors easily could concern the mother more than the child's inheri-
tance rights and may lead the mother to abandon or reject the oppor-
tunity to establish her child's paternity.
A further obstacle encountered in paternity statutes of Illinois and
many other states is the limitation of paternity actions to a period of
years following the birth of the illegitimate child.77 In Illinois, the
72. See Krause, Legitimate and Illegitimate Offspring of Levy v. Louisiana-First Decisions
on Equal Protection and Paternity, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 338, 349-50 (1969).
73. The Illinois statute provides:
A proceeding to establish the paternity of a child born out of wedlock and to estab-
lish and enforce liability for its support, maintenance, education, and welfare shall
be instituted in the Circuit Court. Such action may be instituted only on the filing
of a complaint in writing (a) by the mother of the child born out of wedlock, (b) by a
woman who is pregnant with child, which, if born alive, may be born out of wed-
lock, or (c) by the Illinois Department of Public Aid in behalf of a minor child who
is receiving financial aid under "The Illinois Public Aid Code".... No such action
may be brought after the expiration of two years from the birth of the child.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 106 3/4, § 54 (1975).
74. See note 6 supra.
75. Most paternity statutes allow the action to be brought by either the mother, guardian,
or public officer charged with the care of the child. See Note, Paternity, J. FAM. L. 611 (1977).
76. KRAUSE, supra note 1, at 113.
77. Most states have time limits on paternity actions. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §
19-6-101 (1974) (five years); HAW. REV. STAT. § 584-7 (Supp. 1975) (three years); IND. CODE
ANN. § 31-4-1-26 (Burns 1973) (two years); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1104 (1973) (one year); KY.
REV. STAT. § 406.031 (1972) (three years); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-9-9 (1972) (one year). But see
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13 § 500 et seq. (1974) (no specified limit); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2305.14 (Baldwin 1971) (no specified limit, 10-year statute of limitations applies). See generally 9
UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT 365-66 (Supp. 1976), which provides a three year limitation on the
action, with the exception that the illegitimate may bring the action within three years of
reaching majority. See also Huss v. DeMott, 215 Kan. 450, 524 P.2d 743 (1974) (limitation in
paternity statute applies to mother only, illegitimate has common-law right to establish pater-
nity).
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action must be brought within two years of the child's birth. 78  Thus,
it is clear that even in a state granting illegitimates standing to estab-
lish their paternity, limiting the action to the early years of the child's
life puts the illegitimate just as much in reliance on another person to
secure his right to inherit as before Trimble.
Consideration of these limitations on paternity actions was beyond
the scope of Trimble since Deta Mona Trimble's paternity had been
adjudicated and therefore was not at issue. However, further litiga-
tion aimed at improving the status of illegitimates will likely center
on the requirements of paternity statutes, due to the increased em-
phasis on proof of paternity as the only requirement for illegitimates
to satisfy before securing their rights.
CONCLUSION
Further improvement in the status of some illegitimate children of
intestate men will not occur until the right fact situation is before the
Court. However, the result in Trimble substantially increased the
rights of illegitimates whose paternity has been adjudicated in accor-
dance with the relevant paternity statute. 79 In addition, illegitimates
as a class will benefit since Trimble virtually overrules Labine.80
78. See note 73 supra; Cessna v. Montgomery, 63 1Il.2d 71, 344 N.E.2d 447 (1976). In
Cessna, a mother's suit to establish the paternity of her illegitimate children, in which the
Illinois Supreme Court upheld the two-year limitation on the institution of a paternity suit,
although the father may be estopped from asserting the limitation. The Court also upheld the
requirement that the action be brought by the mother. See also Colorado ex rel. L.B. v. L.V.B.,
410 U.S. 976 (1972) (appeal dismissed) (five year limitation on paternity suits presents no federal
question).
79. Trimble has the potential to benefit a large number of illegitimates. See Jurisdictional
Statement at 8, Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977): "The statutes of 21 states, in addition
to Illinois, explicitly, by implication, or by judicial construction, deny illegitimate children the
right to inherit from an intestate father, while providing for inheritance from an intestate
mother."
80. The Supreme Court in Trimble gave a closer scrutiny to the Illinois statute than the
Court did in Labine. In fact, it is clear that the equal protection analysis to be given classifica-
tions of illegitimate children is so much greater that Labine is virtually overruled: "it is apparent
that we have examined the Illinois statute more critically than the Court examined the
Louisiana statute in Labine. To the extent that our analysis in this case differs from that in
Labine, the more recent analysis controls." Id. at 1468 n.17. Labine has been widely criticized
by commentators. See Turton, Unequal Protection of the Illegitimate Child, 13 S. TEx. L.J. 126
(1971); Pascal, Louisiana Succession and Related Laws and the Illegitimate: Thoughts Prompted
by Labine v. Vincent, 46 TUL. L. REv. 167 (1971); Petrillo, Labine v. Vincent: Illegitimates,
Inheritance, and the Fourteenth Amendment, 75 DiCm. L. REV. 377 (1971). Labine has also
generally been limited to the area of intestate succession. See, e.g., Weber v. Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 170 (1972); Eskra v. Morton, 524 F.2d 9, 13 (1975); Lucas v. H.E.W.,
390 F. Supp. 1310, 1317 n.6 (D.R.I. 1975); Davis v. Richardson, 342 F. Supp. 588, 592 (D.
Conn. 1972); Norton v. Weinberger, 364 F. Supp. 1117 (D. Md. 1973), aff'd on rehearing, 390
F. Supp. 1084 (1975); Miller v. Laird, 349 F. Supp. 1034, 1041 (D.D.C. 1972).
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Labine had not only validated a discriminatory intestate succession
statute, but also advocated the weakest possible equal protection
standard of review.81 Now, no doubt should remain. The Supreme
Court will apply more than mere minimal scrutiny to statutes which
treat illegitimates differently from similarly situated legitimates.
Legislatures would do well to refrain from employing statutory clas-
sifications except to the extent that the uncertainty of a child's pater-
nity may be exploited dishonestly.
Michael J. Zarski
81. 401 U.S. 532, 536 n.6 (1970).

